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Abstract
We consider a life-cycle model with idiosyncratic risk in labor earnings, out-of-pocket
medical and nursing home expenses, and survival. Partial insurance is available through
welfare, Medicaid, and social security. Calibrating the model to the U.S., we find
that nursing home expenses play an important role in the savings of the wealthy. In
our policy analysis, we find that elimination of out-of-pocket expenses through public
health care would reduce the capital stock by 12 percent, Medicaid and old-age welfare
programs crowd out 44 percent of savings and greatly increase wealth inequality, and
social security effects are influenced by out-of-pocket health expenses.
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1 Introduction
Out-of-pocket medical and nursing home expenses increase quickly with age and are highly
volatile and persistent. The two main ways the elderly insure their consumption against this
risk are private savings and social safety nets. The objective of this paper is to assess the
role played by medical and nursing home expenses in wealth accumulation and inequality,
and to quantitatively evaluate the effects of old-age U.S. social insurance policies such as
Medicaid, the social welfare program, and progressive social security. Our analysis is novel
for three reasons. First, we document some facts on the size and distribution of medical and
nursing home expenses in the U.S. Second, we explicitly model nursing home expenses, in
addition to medical expenses, in order to capture the fact that nursing home costs are one of
the largest faced by the elderly and the least insured. Third, unlike previous studies in the
literature, our model is cast in a general equilibrium framework, allowing us to analyze the
price effects of policy changes on savings and inequality. We argue that Medicaid provides
differential insurance against medical versus nursing home expense risk and show that this
differential plays a crucial role in aggregate and cross-sectional wealth accumulation.
Despite the fact that out-of-pocket (OOP) medical and nursing home expenses of the
elderly (individuals 65 years of age and over) constitute a relatively small fraction of aggregate
income in the U.S. – in 2000 these expenses were 1.5 percent of GDP – average individual
expenses are high relative to per capita income, and this ratio increases with age. For
example, for 65 to 74 year-olds average individual expenses were 10 percent of per capita
income, while they were as high as 22 percent for those 85 years and older.1 Recent studies
by French and Jones (2003, 2004) and De Nardi, French, and Jones (2006) document the risk
of large OOP health expenditures faced by the elderly. Using Health and Retirement Study
data from the 2000 to 2006 waves, we find that, consistent with these studies, OOP medical
expenses of the elderly are large and volatile. In addition, we find that the cross-sectional
distribution of OOP expenditures is highly unequal, with a Gini coefficient of 0.67, and is
highly concentrated, with the top 10 percent of spenders accounting for 51 percent of total
health expenditures. These observations are in part driven by nursing home expenses, which
are among the highest health costs faced by individuals: average annual nursing home cost
per resident is twice the level of per capita income. Moreover, demand for nursing home
care is highly persistent. According to Dick, Garber and MaCurdy (1994), 18 percent of 65
year olds will spend more than 6 months in a nursing home before the end of their life, with
nearly half of these individuals spending more than 3 years, and nearly a quarter spending
more than 5 years.
1Authors calculations for 2002 based on the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
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Most medical and nursing home expense insurance for the elderly in the U.S. is publicly-
provided as private insurance markets are scarce, especially for long-term care. The major
public insurance programs are Medicare and Medicaid. While Medicare is an entitlement
program for the elderly and disabled, Medicaid is a means-tested program for the poor. In
our theoretical analysis we focus on OOP health expenses and the Medicaid program.2 We
argue that Medicaid provides differential insurance for medical versus nursing home expense
risk by guaranteing a lower level of consumption under a bankruptcy caused by nursing home
expenses than under a bankruptcy caused by medical expenses.
We build a life-cycle model with overlapping generations of individuals and population
growth. Individuals work till age 65 and then retire. During the working stage of their lives,
individuals face earnings uncertainty. Retired individuals face uncertainty with respect to
their survival as well as medical and nursing home expenses. Different histories of earnings
give rise to cross-sectional wealth inequality well before retirement. We assume that individ-
uals cannot borrow and that there are no markets to insure against labor market, medical,
nursing home, or survival risk. Partial insurance, however, is available through three pro-
grams run by the government: a progressive pay-as-you-go social security program, a welfare
program that guarantees a minimum level of consumption under consumer bankruptcy, and
a Medicaid-like social safety net that guarantees a minimum consumption level under med-
ical and nursing home bankruptcies. We allow the insured consumption floor to be specific
to the type of bankruptcy.
The absence of insurance markets coupled with borrowing constraints creates a strong
incentive for precautionary saving. Means-testing of social insurance implies that the rich
rely on private savings much more than the poor. The welfare program discourages saving
of low-income workers early on in life, and Medicaid further discourages saving to finance
health expenses in old-age. As an individual’s permanent earnings increases, he becomes less
likely to qualify for Medicaid, and health expenses gain importance in his life-cycle savings.
In addition, more savings are required for nursing home than for medical expenses because
nursing home costs are one of the largest and most persistent health expense realizations
in the model economy. Since low-income individuals are more likely to find their nursing
home costs, for the most part, unaffordable, they are also more likely to rely on Medicaid
to cover nursing home care. Thus, the saving behavior of low-income individuals is driven
mostly by smaller OOP medical expenses rather than by nursing home expenses. Saving
behavior of wealthier individuals, on the other hand, is driven primarily by nursing home
2We do not model Medicare because we do not model demand for health care, but treat health expenses
as exogenous shocks. In such an environment an entitlement program such as Medicare has no effect on
individual behavior apart from the tax distortions induced by its public finance.
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expenses. Finally, progressive social security provides better insurance against health expense
and survival risk for the poor than the rich. To sum up, individuals across the permanent
earnings distribution effectively face different kinds of the OOP health expense risk. How
these public insurance programs jointly affect aggregate wealth accumulation and inequality
is a quantitative question we seek to answer.
We calibrate the benchmark economy to a set of cross-sectional moments from the U.S.
data. To pin down the stochastic process for medical costs, we use data from the Health
and Retirement Study. Since in the data we only observe OOP health expenditures and
not total (before Medicaid subsidies) expenditures, we cannot directly infer the medical cost
process. Instead, and unlike other studies, we calibrate the process so that the distribu-
tion of OOP expenditures generated by the model matches the one observed in the data.
Furthermore, since the quality of life in a public nursing home is not directly measured,
we calibrate the consumption floor for nursing home bankruptcy by matching Medicaid’s
share of nursing home expenses in the data. The calibration procedure delivers a value for
the consumption floor guaranteed under nursing home bankruptcy which lies below that
for medical bankruptcy. We interpret this differential as reflecting a lower quality of life
provided by public nursing home care relative to receiving public-assistance while living at
home. Comparing the wealth distribution generated by the model, and not targeted by the
calibration procedure, with that observed in the U.S., we conclude that the model presents
a well-disciplined quantitative theory of life-cycle wealth inequality.
We find that precautionary savings are primarily accumulated to insure against uncer-
tainty about lifetime OOP health expenses. In particular, uncertainty about length of life
which impacts the number of years of expense risk and the size of expenses. Precautionary
savings due to health expense risk are driven by OOP nursing home expense risk. Moreover,
our policy experiments show that medical and nursing home expenses and the structure of
the social insurance system in the U.S. play an important role in wealth accumulation and go
a long way toward explaining wealth inequality. Our policy analysis consists of three sets of
experiments. In the first set of experiments, we introduce public health care such that med-
ical and/or nursing home expenses are fully covered by the government. In the second set
of experiments, we vary the availability of safety nets for different types of bankruptcies. In
the third set of experiments, we vary social security policy from progressive to proportional
to none.
Introducing public health care greatly reduces incentives to save for old age. Our model
predicts that a complete elimination of OOP health expenses reduces the aggregate capital
stock by 12 percent. Both types of health expenses – medical and nursing home – contribute
equally to the aggregate effect. However, on the individual level, saving responses differ
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dramatically across the permanent earnings distribution. The decline in asset holdings of the
top two permanent earnings quintiles accounts for three quarters of the aggregate effect, and
this decline is driven by the elimination of OOP nursing home expenses. On the contrary, the
second and third quintiles respond mostly to the elimination of medical expenses, whereas the
bottom quintile’s saving behavior is nearly unaffected by public health care. The differential
response to public health care is explained by the type of OOP expenses faced by each
quintile: while medical expenses dominate the saving behavior of the poor, nursing home
expenses have a bigger impact on the saving behavior of the wealthy. Since the top quintile
is the major saver in the economy, when prices and taxes are held constant, aggregate
effects of policy changes are also driven by nursing home expenses. In a general equilibrium,
removal of nursing home expenses results in fewer distortions in saving behavior relative to
removal of medical expenses, causing a smaller increase in the capital stock relative to its
partial equilibrium level. The importance of a general equilibrium analysis is clear: partial
equilibrium overstates the aggregate effect of public health care on capital accumulation by
almost 60 percent.
We also find that the introduction of public health care for the elderly dramatically
increases within-cohort wealth inequality. This is explained by the fact that individuals in
the middle of the permanent earnings distribution face the largest OOP health expenses
relative to their income. As a result, in percentage terms, their savings fall the most in
response to public coverage of health expenses, reducing their share of aggregate wealth.
The importance of nursing home expenses for savings is driven by the differential amount
of subsidies provided by Medicaid under nursing home versus medical bankruptcies. In fact,
once the government increases the level of consumption provided to individuals under public
nursing home care to the level provided to non-nursing home Medicaid recipients, the capital
stock drops by 4 percent. In addition, introduction of public health care into such an economy
results in a smaller decline in savings than it does in the benchmark economy.
Moreover, we find that government-provided safety nets for the elderly (Medicaid in
particular) play a dominant role in wealth accumulation and inequality. While removing all
welfare programs in the benchmark economy increases aggregate capital by 134 percent and
reduces the wealth Gini by 28 points, removing Medicaid alone increases the capital stock
by 126 percent and reduces the wealth Gini by 26 percentage points. The dominant role
of Medicaid is explained by the timing of shocks: earnings and health expense shocks are
experienced at different stages of the life cycle, allowing workers to buffer their consumption
with precautionary savings accumulated in anticipation of health expenses at older ages.
Finally, we find that the presence of OOP health expenses amplifies the effect that the
progressivity of social security has on savings but dampens social security’s crowding-out
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effect. Replacing progressive social security benefits with proportional ones reduces the
capital stock by 8 percent in the economy with OOP health expenses and by 7 percent in
the economy without them. The decline in aggregate capital in the two economies is almost
entirely due to lower wealth accumulation by the top permanent earnings quintile – the
quintile that faces a substantial increase in its social security replacement rate. Removing
social security altogether increases aggregate capital by 37 percent in the economy with
OOP health expenses and by 55 percent in the economy without them. The need to finance
OOP health expenses at old ages increases saving incentives counteracting the reduction in
incentives due to social security.
Our analysis extends a large literature on life-cycle savings and wealth inequality. To
date, general equilibrium models have primarily focused on idiosyncratic earnings risk as the
source of high wealth inequality. Castaneda et al. (2003) present an excellent survey and
show that a life-cycle model with idiosyncratic uncertainty about labor market efficiency
units can be calibrated to accurately match a wide set of moments characterizing the U.S.
earnings and wealth distributions.
However, earnings risk as a sole source of heterogeneity in wealth fails to account for
slow rates of dissaving observed for retired individuals, including those without inheritance
motives. A number of empirical studies have suggested that the slow dissaving rate is largely
due to the anticipation of high medical expense shocks (Hubbard et al. (1995), Palumbo
(1999), Scholz et al. (2006), De Nardi et al. (2006), among others). These studies have shown
that precautionary savings for medical expense and survival risk can explain a substantial
part of old-age savings and inequality in the presence of means-tested social insurance.
Moreover, they have shown that the extent of publicly provided insurance against medical
expense risk has large effects on savings even for wealthy individuals. While these findings
were obtained in partial-equilibrium frameworks, our general equilibrium analysis shows that
changes in the interest rate and taxes have large consequences for aggregate effects of social
insurance policies.
Works most closely related to our analysis are by Hubbard et al. (1995) and De Nardi et
al. (2006). The main contributions of our paper relative to these studies include: (i) general
equilibrium analysis; (ii) calibration of the stochastic process governing health expenses
instead of treating OOP expenses in the data as before-insurance expenses; (iii) explicit
modeling of nursing home risk that generates a “Medicaid aversion”; (iv) evaluation of a
more extensive set of social insurance policies.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 documents some facts on medical and nursing
home expenses and social insurance policies. Section 3 presents the model and Section 4
discusses the calibration strategy. A discussion of the benchmark economy as a theory of
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life-cycle inequality is presented in Section 5, and the results of the policy experiments are
in Sections 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Evidence on Health Expenses and Public Insurance
In this section we first discuss the size, composition and public insurance coverage of health
expenditures on aggregate, and then document the distribution of these expenditures across
the elderly. Among personal health expenditures, defined as national health expenditures
net of expenditures on medical construction and medical research, we distinguish between
medical and nursing home expenditures. Medical expenditures include expenditures on hos-
pital, physician and clinical services, prescription drugs, dental care, other professional and
personal health care, home health care, nondurables and durables. Nursing home expendi-
tures include expenditures on care within skilled nursing facilities (facilities for individuals
who require daily nursing care and living assistance) but not the costs of services provided by
retirement homes or assisted-living facilities. We take a look at two public health insurance
programs: Medicare and Medicaid. While Medicare is a federal entitlement program for the
elderly and disabled, Medicaid is a means-tested, federal/state program for the poor. We
find that medical expenditures are substantially different from nursing home expenditures
in both risk and public insurance coverage.
2.1 Personal Health Expenditures
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, personal health expendi-
tures accounted for 13 percent of GDP in 2002. Thirty-five percent of these, or 4.4 percent
of GDP, were expenditures on the elderly (individuals 65 years of age and over). In per
capita terms, however, personal health expenditures on the elderly outweigh expenditures
for the rest of the adult population. While the average expenditure on someone less than 65
years of age was close to the national average of 13 percent of per capita GDP, the average
expenditure on a 65 to 74 year old was twice this amount, while for 75 to 84 year olds
and individuals age 85 and up it was three times and five times this amount, respectively.
Personal health expenditures by age as a percent of GDP and per capita GDP are provided
in Table 1.
How were the large expenditures on the elderly financed? Table 2 shows that 34 percent of
total personal health expenditures, or 1.5 percent of GDP, were privately financed either out-
of-pocket, with private insurance or through other means, while the remaining 66 percent,
or 2.9 percent of GDP, were publicly financed by either Medicare, Medicaid, or other public
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Table 1: Personal Health Expenditures, 2002
by age total per capita
% % of GDP % of GDP p.c.
All ages 100 13 13
Under 65 65 8.6 13∗
65+ 35 4.4 36
65-74 13 1.6 26
75-84 14 1.7 40
85+ 8 1 66
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
∗ 19-64 year old
Table 2: Personal Health Expenditures by How Financed for Individuals Ages 65 and Over,
2002
Source of Payment % of total % of GDP
All 100 4.4
Private 34 1.5
Out-of-pocket∗ 16 0.7
Private Insurance 16 0.7
Other 2 0.1
Public 66 2.9
Medicare 48 2.1
Medicaid 14 0.6
Other 4 0.2
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
programs. Note that Medicaid finances a substantial portion – 14 percent – of the elderly’s
medical expenses, or 0.6 percent of GDP. Table 3 shows that medical expenditures of the
elderly net of Medicare are primarily funded by private sources: either OOP directly or
indirectly through insurance payments. Private payments of the elderly accounted for 12.3
percent of per capita GDP while Medicaid accounted for 5.2 percent. In addition, both
private and Medicaid payments for medical care as a share of per capita GDP increase with
age. Note that Medicaid’s share of total expenditures net of Medicare increases with age as
well: it is 22 percent for 65 to 74 year-olds, 29 percent for 75 to 84 year-olds, and 41 percent
for individuals ages 85 and up. Older individuals are more likely to have large medical
expenditures and to be impoverished by large OOP medical expenditures at earlier ages,
making them eligible for Medicaid transfers.
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Table 3: Per Capita Private and Medicaid Health Expenditures as a Percent of Per Capita
GDP, 2002
Age Private Medicaid
65+ 12.3 5.2
65-74 9.7 2.7
75-84 12.7 5.2
85+ 21.6 15.1
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
2.2 Nursing Home Care
Nursing home costs are one of the largest OOP health expenses faced by the elderly. Accord-
ing to the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, in 2002 nursing home care accounted for 19
percent of personal health expenditures for individuals ages 65 and over and 0.85 percent of
GDP. However, since only 4 percent of the elderly resided in nursing homes (Federal Agency
Forum of Aging-Related Statistics), the cost per nursing home resident was substantially
higher – 190 percent of per capita GDP. Consistent with these statistics, the Metlife Market
Survey of Nursing Home and Assisted Living Costs reports that the average daily rate for
a private room in a nursing home in 2005 was $203 or $74,095 annually while the average
daily rate for a semiprivate room was $176 or $64,240 annually.
Nursing home expenses in the U.S. are predominantly financed either OOP or publicly
by either the Medicare or Medicaid programs. However, Medicare coverage for nursing home
care is limited in that it only covers costs for the first six months of care and partially
subsidizes the next six months. Thus while Medicare is the primary payer of nursing home
costs for residents with short-term stays (stays of less than one year) its contribution to costs
after the first year is extremely small. In addition private insurance markets for long-term
care are scarce. While this is in part due to supply-side problems that result in high costs and
unreliable coverage, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) find that the lack of private long-term care
insurance markets is largely due to the public insurance system (Medicare and Medicaid)
crowding out private insurance. This occurs despite the fact that the public insurance
system is far from satisfactory since it provides only a limited reduction in risk exposure
except for the poorest individuals. As a result, relative to other health expenditures, only
a small amount of nursing home care costs for individuals over 65 are covered by Medicare
or through private insurance. Table 4 provides a breakdown of nursing home care expenses
for individuals ages 65 and over by payment source. As shown in the table, the elderly’s
nursing home costs are primarily funded either out-of-pocket (37 percent) or by Medicaid
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Table 4: Percent of Nursing Home Residents by Primary Payment Source for Individuals
of All Ages and Sources of Payment for Nursing Homes/Long-term care Institutions for
Individuals Ages 65 and Over, 2002
Source of Payment % of NH residents ‡ % of total NH exp.‡‡ % of GDP ‡‡
Total NH exp. 100 100 0.85
Private 26 43 0.37
Out-of-pocket 37 0.31
Private Insurance 2 0.02
Other 4 0.04
Public 74 57 0.48
Medicare 15 18 0.15
Medicaid 58 37 0.31
Other 1 2 0.02
‡ Source: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and Uninsured, prepared by E. O’Brien and R. Elias, 2004
‡‡ Source: Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, 2002.
(37 percent). The table also shows the breakdown of nursing home residents of all ages by
primary payment type. Note that the majority, 58 percent, of nursing home residents at
any given time are Medicaid recipients while the smallest percentage are primarily financed
through Medicare.
Moreover, there are important differences in the Medicaid qualifications for medical ex-
penses versus nursing home expenses. In particular, non-nursing home recipients of Medicaid
are allowed to keep their homes, cars, income, and other assets guaranteeing them a certain
level of consumption. However, nursing home residents on Medicaid must contribute all their
non-home, non-car assets in excess of $2,000 and all of their monthly income, excluding a
small (between $30 and $90) “personal needs allowance” to their nursing home and medical
expenses. Although they can keep their home and car while confined to a nursing home,
these assets do not contribute much if any to their level of consumption. In a nursing home
facility, Medicaid covers room and board, nursing care, therapy care, meals, and general
medical supplies. However, Medicaid does not pay for a single room, personal television
and cable, phone and service, radios, batteries, clothes and shoes, repairs of personal items,
personal care services, among other goods and services. The result is that the quality of
life delivered to Medicaid-funded nursing home residents falls well below that of privately-
financed nursing home residents. This view is supported by survey evidence documented by
Ameriks et al. (2007) who find that wealthy people tend to avoid public long-term care due
to its low quality of life. This avoidance is termed “Medicaid aversion.”
Most estimates suggest that at age 65 the probability of ever entering a nursing home
10
before death is somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4 and the average duration of stay is approx-
imately 2 years. However, while the majority of entrants will spend less than 1 year in a
nursing home, with very little out-of-pocket expense risk thanks to Medicare, there is still a
sizable risk of long-term stay in a nursing home resulting in large OOP expenses. For exam-
ple, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) estimate, consistently with the findings of Dick, Garber,
and MaCurdy (1994), that approximately 40 percent of entrants will spend more than 1 year
in a nursing home, while approximately one fifth will spend more than 5 years.
In our theoretical analysis, we capture the differential public insurance for nursing home
versus medical expenses by allowing for a differential in the consumption floor guaranteed
under a medical bankruptcy versus nursing home bankruptcy and calibrating the differential
to be consistent with the data on Medicaid’s share of total nursing home expenses. We show
that this differential insurance for medical versus nursing home expenses plays an important
role in the saving behavior of the wealthy.
2.3 Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditures
To assess the cross-sectional inequality in health expenditures, we use the Health and Re-
tirement Survey, waves 2002, 2004 and 2006, covering medical and nursing home expense
information for the years 2000 through 2005. Our sample consists of individuals, both mar-
ried and single, 65 years of age and older. We include insurance premia in the out-of-pocket
health expenditures. Table 5 presents a set of moments describing the distribution of OOP
medical and nursing home expenses for this sample.
We find that the distribution of OOP health expenses across the elderly is highly unequal,
with a Gini coefficient of 0.67 and a normalized standard deviation of 2.77. In addition, the
expenses are highly concentrated at the top of the distribution, with the top 10 percent of
the elderly accounting for more than half and the top 1 percent for more than a fifth of
total OOP expenses. Moreover, OOP expenses increase with permanent earnings. Since
data on lifetime earnings is not available to us, we use social security income (SSI) as a
proxy. The top SSI quintile spends OOP about twice as much as the bottom quintile. Such
a pattern is expected in the presence of a means-tested subsidy which provides more social
insurance to the lower-income quintiles. Although some studies find that the rich spend more
on health services not only due to lower subsidies, but also due to consumption of a higher
quantity/quality of health services (see, for example, De Nardi, French and Jones (2006)), in
this analysis we take an extreme but simple view that attributes the differences in the OOP
health expenses across income groups entirely to the means-testing of social insurance.
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Table 5: OOP Health Expense Distribution: Selected Moments
OOP Health Expenses
Gini 0.67
Shares of Total, %
First Quintile 0.13
Second Quintile 2.75
Third Quintile 9.76
Fourth Quintile 20.16
Fifth Quintile 67.21
Top 10% 50.71
Top 5% 38.84
Top 1% 21.77
Shares and Mean Expenses of SSI groups, % shares mean†
First Quintile 13.4 17
Second Quintile 16.7 21
Third Quintile 18.4 23
Fourth Quintile 23.0 29
Fifth Quintile 28.5 36
Top 10% 7.5
Top 5% 6.5
Top 1% 1.4
Source: 2002, 2004, and 2006 Data from the Health and Retirement Study.
† percent of average annual lifetime earnings in 2000
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3 The Model
In light of the evidence presented in the previous section, we model nursing home care
explicitly to allow for differential treatment of medical and nursing home expenses by public
policy. Our theoretical analysis focuses on OOP health expenditures and the Medicaid
program.
3.1 Economic Environment
Time is discrete. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals. An
individual lives to a maximum of J periods, works during the first R periods of his life, and
retires at age R+1. While working, an individual faces uncertainty about his earnings, and
starting from the retirement age, he faces uncertainty about his survival, medical expenses,
and nursing home needs. The government runs a social insurance program that guarantees
a minimum consumption level in case of a bankruptcy. This consumption level differs by the
type of bankruptcy: consumer bankruptcy for workers, medical bankruptcy for retired non-
nursing home residents and nursing home bankruptcy for nursing home residents. In addition,
the government runs a pay-as-you-go social security program. Markets are competitive.
Individual earnings evolve over the life-cycle according to a function Ω(j, z) that maps
individual age j and current earnings shock z into efficiency units of labor, supplied to the
labor market at wage rate w. The earnings shock z follows an age-invariant Markov process
with transition probabilities given by Λzz′ . The efficiency units of the new-born workers is
distributed according to a p.d.f. Γz.
Similarly, medical expenditures evolve stochastically according to a function M(j, h)
that maps individual age j and current expenditure shock h into out-of-pockets costs of
health care. The medical expenditure shock h follows an age-invariant Markov process with
transition probabilities Λhh′ . The initial distribution of medical expenditure shocks is given
by Γh and it is independent of the individual state.
The need for nursing home care in the next period of life, at age j + 1, arises with
probability θ(j + 1, h) at each age j > R + 1 and with probability θ¯R+1 at age R + 1. The
probability of entering a nursing home next period is increasing in age. For agents beyond
age R + 1 the entry probability is increasing in the previous period’s medical expense. For
simplicity, we assume that nursing home is an absorbing state. While in a nursing home,
agents have constant medical expenditure Mn, which corresponds to the health shock value
hn.
There are no insurance markets to hedge either earnings, medical expenditure, nursing
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home, or mortality risks. Self-insurance is achieved with precautionary savings (labor supply
is exogenous). Individuals cannot borrow. Unintended bequests are taxed away by the
government and are used to finance government expenditure and social insurance transfers.3
3.2 Demographics
Agents face survival probabilities that are conditional on both age and nursing home status.
The probability that an age-(j− 1) individual survives to age j is sj if he is not residing in a
nursing home, and snj < sj if he is in a nursing home. Since a working-age agent faces neither
mortality nor nursing home risk, his survival probability is sj = 1, j = 1, 2, ..., R. Let θ¯j
denote the unconditional (independent of the previous period’s medical expense) probability
of entering a nursing home at age j. Then, without conditioning on his current medical
expense shock, an age-(j − 1), retired individual enters a nursing home in period j with
probability θ¯j > 0. Let λj denote the fraction of cohort j residing in a nursing home. This
fraction is zero for working-age cohorts. For a newly retired cohort, the fraction is just the
unconditional probability of entering a nursing home, so λR+1 = θ¯R+1. Finally, for a retired
cohort of age R + 1 < j ≤ J , the fraction λj evolves according to
λj =
θ¯jsj(1− λj−1) + snj λj−1
s¯j
,
where the denominator, s¯j = sj(1 − λj−1) + snj λj−1, is the average survival rate from age
j − 1 to j and the numerator is a weighted sum of the survival rate of new entrants and the
survival rate of current residents.
Population grows at a constant rate n. Then the size of cohort j relative to that of cohort
j − 1 is
ηj =
ηj−1s¯j
1 + n
, for j = 2, 3, ..., J.
3.3 Workers’ Savings
The state of a working individual consists of his age j, assets a, average lifetime earnings
to date e¯, and current productivity shock z. The individual’s taxable income y consists of
his interest income ra and labor earnings e net of the payroll tax τe(e). The individual allo-
cates his assets, taxable income less income taxes τy(y), and transfers from the government
3We do this to avoid the unrealistic impact that redistributing bequests as lump-sum transfers would
have on agents eligibility for means-tested transfers. In addition, we wish to avoid the unrealistic impact
that an arbitrary redistribution of bequests would have on individuals’ saving behavior in response to policy
changes.
14
T (j, y, a) between consumption c and savings a′ by solving
V (j, a, e¯, z) = max
c,a′≥0
{
U(c) + βEz
[
V (j + 1, a′, e¯′, z′)
]}
(1)
subject to
c+ a′ = a+ y − τy(y) + T (y, a), (2)
y = e− τe(e) + ra, (3)
e = wΩ(j, z), (4)
e¯′ = (e+ je¯)/(j + 1), (5)
T (y, a) = max
{
0, cw − [a+ y − τy(y)]}. (6)
where cw is a minimum consumption level insured under a consumer bankruptcy.
3.4 Old-age Health Care
Retired individuals face uncertainty about their medical and nursing home needs. The
nursing home state is entered once and for all, but every period individuals can choose
between private and public nursing home care. An individual’s nursing home status is
denoted by the variable l, which takes a value of either 0, indicating that the individual is
currently not in a nursing home, 1, indicating that he is currently in a nursing home under
private care, or 2, indicating that he is currently in a nursing home under public care.
3.4.1 Medical care
Conditional on surviving to the next period, a working individual of age R with state (a, e¯, z)
will enter a nursing home upon retirement with probability θ¯R+1. His future state contains
a health shock, h′, that determines his medical care costs. The problem of this individual is
V (R, a, e¯, z) = maxc,a′≥0
{
U(c) + βsR+1(1− θ¯R+1)E
[
V (R + 1, a′, e¯, h′, 0)
]
+ (7)
βsR+1θ¯R+1max
[
V (R + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 1), V (R + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 2)
]}
(8)
subject to the constraints above.
Resources of a retired individual of age j > R come from the return on his savings
(1+r)a, his social security benefit S(e¯), and government transfers T (j, a, e¯, h). After paying
health care costs M(j, h) and income taxes, the individual allocates his remaining resources
between consumption and savings. Conditional on survival, the agent will entering a nursing
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home next period with probability θ(j + 1, h). We assume that the health shock does not
directly affect agents’ utility. An age-j individual with assets a, average life-time earnings
e¯, health shock h, and who is not in a nursing home solves
V (j, a, e¯, h, 0) = maxc,a′≥0
{
U(c) + βsj+1
(
1− θ(j + 1, h))Eh[V (j + 1, a′, e¯, h′, 0)]+
βsj+1θ(j + 1, h)max
[
V (j + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 1), V (j + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 2)
]} (9)
subject to
c+M(j, h) + a′ = a+ y − τy
(
max
{
0, ra−max[0,M(j, h)− κra]})+ T (j, a, h) , (10)
y = S(e¯) + ra, (11)
T (j, a, h) = max
{
0, cm +M(j, h)− [a+ y − τy(ra)]
}
(12)
where cm is the minimum consumption level guaranteed under a medical bankruptcy. Agents
receive a medical expense income tax deduction. In other words, individuals pay taxes on
their interest income minus the fraction of their medical expenses that exceed κ percentage
of their taxable income.
3.4.2 Nursing home care
Once nursing home needs arise, an individual has to choose between private and public
nursing home care. We assume that private care differs from public only in the consumption
value it provides (nicer rooms but the same medical care). Public nursing home care provides
a uniform level of consumption, denoted by cn. By letting cn differ from cm, we allow for
differential insurance provided under medical and nursing home bankruptcies. Hence the
government’s per resident cost of nursing home care is Mn + cn. To qualify for public
nursing home care, an individual must meet the following eligibility criteria: his income net
of taxes plus the value of assets have to fall below a threshold level. Note that individuals
will only choose public care if their consumption level under private care falls below cn. In
addition, since the agents’ income streams during retirement are deterministic and constant,
an agent receiving public care would never choose to switch to private care in the future.
Thus, for simplicity, we assume that when an individual enters public care he surrenders all
of his assets as well as current and future pension income to the government and has no
further decisions to make.
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An individual in private nursing home care decides how much to save and whether to
switch to public nursing care by solving
V (j, a, e¯, hn, 1) = max
c,a′≥0
{
u(c) + βsnj+1max
[
V (j + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 1), V (j + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 2)
]}
(13)
subject to
c+Mn + a′ = a+ y − τy
(
max
{
0, ra−max[0,Mn − κra]}), (14)
y = S(e¯) + ra, (15)
where the value of entering a public nursing home is
V (j + 1, a′, e¯, hn, 2) =
J∑
i=j
[
βi−j
i−1∏
k=j
snk+1u(c
n)
]
≡ V¯ nj+1.
Note that there are no government transfers to individuals receiving private nursing home
care. However, such individuals are still eligible for a medical expense tax deduction.
3.5 Goods Production
Firms produce goods by combining capitalK and labor L according to a constant-returns-to-
scale production technology: F (K,L). Capital depreciates at rate δ and can be accumulated
through investments of goods: I = K ′− (1− δ)K. Firms maximize profits by renting capital
and labor from households. Perfectly competitive markets ensure that factors of production
are paid their marginal products. Goods can be consumed by individuals, used in health
care, and invested in physical capital.
3.6 General Equilibrium
We consider a steady-state competitive equilibrium in this economy. For the purposes of
defining an equilibrium in a compact way, we suppress the individual state into a vector
(j, x), where
x =
{
xW ≡ (a, e¯, z), if 1 ≤ j ≤ R,
xR ≡ (a, e¯, h, l), if R < j ≤ J,
Accordingly, we redefine value functions, decision rules, taxable income and transfers to be
functions of the individual state (j, x): V (j, x), c(j, x), a′(j, x), l(j, xR), y(j, xW ) and T (j, x).
Define the individual state spaces: XW ⊂ [0,∞)× [0,∞)×(−∞,∞), XR ⊂ [0,∞)× [0,∞)×
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(−∞,∞)×{0, 1, 2}, and denote by Ξ(X) the Borel σ-algebra on X ∈ {XW , XR}. Let Ψj(X)
be a probability measure of individuals with state x ∈ X in cohort j. Note that these agents
constitute an ηjΨj(X) fraction of the total population.
DEFINITION. A steady-state equilibrium is {c(j, x), a′(j, x), l(j, xR), V (j, x)}x∈{xW ,xR},
{Ψj}Jj=1, {w, r,K, L} and {τs(e), d, τy(y), S(e¯)} such that
1. Given prices, the decision rules c(j, x), a′(j, x), l(j, xR) solve the dynamic programming
problems of the households (1),(7),(9),and (13).
2. Prices are competitive:
(a) w = FL(K,L)
(b) r = FK(K,L)− δ
3. Markets clear
(a) Goods:
∑
j ηj
∫
X
c(j, x)dΨj + (1 + n)K + M˜ +G = F (K,L) + (1− δ)K
(b) Capital:
∑
j ηj
∫
X
a′(j, x)dΨj = (1 + n)K
(c) Labor:
∑
j ηj
∫
X
Ω(j, z)dΨj = L
(d) Medical care:∑J
j=R ηj
∫
XR
{M(j, h)I[l(j, x) = 0]dΨj +MnI[l(j, x) > 0]} dΨj = M˜ .
4. The laws of motion for the invariant distributions of agents are consistent with the
individual behavior:
Ψj+1(X0) =
∫
X0
{∫
X
Qj(x, x
′)I [j′ = j + 1] dΨj
}
dx′
for all X0 ∈ Ξ, where
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Qj(x, x
′) ≡ I [j = 1, a′ = a′(1, a, 0, z), e¯′ = wΩ(1, z)] Γz
+ I [1 ≤ j < R, a′ = a′(j, a, e¯, z), e¯′ = (wΩ(j, z) + je¯)/(j + 1)] Λz,z′
+ I [j = R, a′ = a′(R, a, e¯, z), e¯′ = e¯]
× {Γh′I [l′ = 0] (1− θ¯R+1) + I [h′ = hn, l′ > 0] θ¯R+1}
+ I [R < j ≤ J, a′ = a′(j, a, e¯, h, 0), e¯′ = e¯]
× {Λh,h′I [l′ = 0] (1− θ(j + 1, h)) + I [h′ = hn, l′ = 1] θ(j + 1, h)} sj+1
s¯j+1
+ I [R < j ≤ J, a′ = a′(j, a, e¯, hn, 1), e¯′ = e¯, l′ = 1] s
n
j+1
s¯j+1
+ I [R < j ≤ J, a′ = 0, e¯′ = e¯, l′ = 2] s
n
j+1
s¯j+1
and I is an indicator function.
5. Social security payments are financed by labor earnings taxes:
SStransfers = EarnsTaxes
where total earnings tax revenue is
EarnsTaxes =
R∑
j=1
ηj
∫
XW
τe(e)dΨj,
and total social security payments is
SStransfers =
J∑
j=R+1
ηj
∫
XR
S(e¯)dΨj.
6. Government budget is balanced:
IncTaxes+Bequests =MTTransfers+GovtSpend
where income taxes are given by
IncTaxes =
J∑
j=1
ηj
∫
X
τy(y(j, x))dΨj,
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bequests are given by
Bequests =
1 + r
1 + n
J∑
j=R+1
ηj−1
∫
X
{I[l(j − 1, x) = 0](1− sj)
+I[l(j − 1, x) > 0](1− snj )
}
a′(j − 1, x)dΨj−1
total means-tested transfer payments are
MTTransfers =
J∑
j=1
ηj
∫
X
T (j, x)dΨj +
J∑
j=R+1
ηj (M
n + cn − S(e¯))
∫
XR
I[l(j, x) = 2]dΨj
− 1 + r
1 + n
J∑
j=R+2
ηj−1
∫
XR×XR
I[l(j − 1, x) < 2, l(j, x′) = 2]a′(j − 1, x)Q(x, x′)dΨj−1dΨj,
and the government spends
GovtSpend = G.
4 Calibration
The model is calibrated to match a set of aggregate and distributional moments for the U.S.
economy, including demographics, earnings, medical and nursing home expenses, as well as
features of the U.S. social welfare, Medicaid, social security and income tax systems. Some
of the parameter values can be determined ex-ante, others are calibrated by making the
moments generated by a stationary equilibrium of the model target corresponding moments
in the data. The calibration procedure minimizes the difference between the targets from
the data and model-predicted values. Our calibration strategy for stochastic processes for
earnings and medical expenses is similar to Castaneda et al. (2003): we do not restrict the
processes to, for example, AR(1), but instead target a wide set of moments characterizing
the earnings and OOP health expense distributions. Unlike Castaneda et al., we do not
target the distribution of wealth because part of our objective is to learn how much wealth
inequality can be generated by idiosyncratic risk in earnings, health expenses, and survival
in a pure life-cycle model.
We start by presenting functional forms and setting parameters whose direct estimates
are available in the data. Although the calibration procedure identifies the rest of the pa-
rameters by solving a simultaneous set of equations, for expositional purposes, we divide the
parameters to be calibrated into groups and discuss associated targets and their measure-
ment in the data. Most of the data statistics used in the calibration procedure are averages
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over or around 2000-2006, which is the time period covered by the HRS. More fundamental
model parameters rely on long-run data averages.
4.1 Age structure
In the model, agents are born at age 21 and can live to a maximum age of 100. We set the
model period to two years because the data on OOP health expenses is available bi-annually.
Thus the maximum life span is J = 40 periods. For the first 44 years of life, i.e. the first 22
periods, the agents work, and at the beginning of period R + 1 = 23, they retire.
Population growth rate n targets the ratio of population 65 year old and over to that
21 years old and over. According to U.S. Census Bureau, this ratio was 0.18 in 2000. We
target this ratio rather than directly set the population growth rate because the weight of
the retired in the population determines the tax burden on workers, which is of a primary
importance to our policy analysis.
4.2 Preferences
The momentary utility function is assumed to be of the constant-relative-risk-aversion form
U(c) =
c1−γ
1− γ ,
so that 1/γ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Based on estimates in the litera-
ture, we set γ equal to 2.0. The subjective discount factor, β is determined in the calibration
procedure such that the rate of return on capital in the model is consistent with an annual
rate of return of 4 percent.
4.2.1 Technology
Consumption goods are produced according to a production function,
F (K,L) = AKαL1−α,
where capital depreciates at rate δ. The parameters α and δ are set using their direct
counterparts in the U.S data: a capital income share of 0.3 and an annual depreciation rate
of 7 percent (Gomme and Rupert (2007)). The parameter A is set such that the wage per
an efficiency unit of labor is normalized to one under the baseline calibration .
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4.3 Earnings Process
In the model, worker’s productivity depends on his age and an idiosyncratic productivity
shock according to a function Ω(j, z). We assume that this function consists of a deterministic
age-dependent component and a stochastic component as follows:
log Ω(j, z) = β1j + β2j
2 + z,
where z follows a finite-valued Markov process with probability transition matrix Λzz′ . Initial
productivity levels are drawn from the distribution Γz.
We assume that there are 5 possible values for z. Thus, specifying the earnings process
requires setting 26 parameters: 2 coefficients on age and age-squared in the deterministic
component, 5 productivity shock levels, 25 elements of Λzz′ and 5 grid points for the initial
distribution of z. In order to reduce the number of unknowns, we fix the grid points.
Moreover, we assume that the probabilities of going from the two lowest productivity levels
to the highest one and from the two highest ones to the lowest one are 0. These restrictions,
combined with imposing the condition that the rows of Λzz′ must sum to one, reduces the
number of parameters in the probability transition matrix to be calibrated from 25 to 16.
Finally imposing that the elements of the initial distribution sum to one leaves 22 parameters
that need to be determined.
The coefficients on age and age-squared are obtained from 1968 to 1996 PSID data for
male workers.4 Thus β1 is set to 0.109 and β2 is set to -0.001. The 20 remaining parameters
are chosen by targeting the variance of log earnings of 55 year-olds relative to 35 year-olds,
the first-order autocorrelation of the stochastic component, the Gini coefficient for earnings,
8 points on the Lorenz curve for earnings, corresponding to the five quintiles and top 1, 5,
and 10 percent of the distribution, the same 8 points in the Lorenz curve for Social Security
income, and mean Social Security income levels by Social Security income quintile. Using
PSID data, Storesletten et al. (2004) estimate the variance of log annual earnings to be
0.46 for 35 year-olds and 0.87 for 55 year-olds. Thus we target a relative variance for 55
year-olds of 1.89. The target for the first-order autocorrelation of annual z is 0.98, taken
from Guvenen (2008) and also based on PSID data. The data points for the earnings Lorenz
curve are taken from Rodriguez at el. (2002). The targets on the Lorenz curve for Social
Security income and mean Social Security by quintile are computed using the sample from
4The sample is restricted to the heads of household, between the age of 18 and 65, not self-employed,
not working for the government, working at least 520 hours during the year; excluding observations with the
average hourly wage (computed as annual earnings over annual hours worked) less than half the minimum
wage in that year; weighted using the PSID sample weights. We thank Gueorgui Kambourov for providing
us with the regression results.
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the HRS data described in Section 2. We target mean Social Security income by quintiles
since we also target mean OOP medical expenditures by Social Security income quintiles,
as discussed below. We use social security income quintiles as a proxy for lifetime earnings
quintiles because lifetime earnings is not available to us.
4.3.1 Medical Expense Process
Retired agents not residing in a nursing home face medical expenses that are a function
of their current age and medical expense shock. Similarly to the earnings process, we as-
sume that medical expenses can be decomposed into a deterministic age component and a
stochastic component:
lnM(j, h) = βm,1j + βm,2j
2 + h,
where h follows a finite state Markov chain with probability transition matrix Λhh′ and newly
retired agents draw their medical expense shock h from an initial distribution denoted by
Γh.
We assume that for each age there are 4 possible medical expense levels, which we fix
exogenously. Thus specifying the process for h requires choosing 20 parameters: 16 parame-
ters specifying the probability transition matrix for h, Ωhh′ , and 4 parameters characterizing
the initial distribution of medical expenditure shocks, Γh. Since the rows of the transition
matrix and the initial distribution must sum to one, the degrees of freedom to be determined
reduces to 15. Thus, including the coefficients in the deterministic component, 17 parameters
still remain to be chosen to specify the medical expense process.
To calibrate the 17 parameters governing the OOP health expense process, we use 20
aggregate and distributional moments for OOP health expenses: the Gini coefficient and 8
points in the Lorenz curve of the OOP medical expense distribution, shares of OOP health
expenses and Medicaid expenses in GDP for each age group – 65 to 74 year-olds, 75 to 84
year-olds, and those 85 and above – and the shares of the OOP health expenses that are
paid by each social security income quintile. The targets and their values in the data are
summarized in the next section. The distributional moments were documented in section
2 using the HRS data. OOP and Medicaid expenses by age groups are 2001-2006 averages
based on the aggregate data from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Note
that our measure of OOP health expenditures corresponds to the sum of all private health
care expenditures, including the costs of health insurance.
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4.3.2 Nursing Home Expense Risk
Starting at age R, agents face age-specific probabilities of entering a nursing home in the
following period and starting at age R + 1, entry probabilities depend on both age and
health. The unconditional probabilities of entering a nursing home at each age j + 1 are
{θ¯j}Jj=R+1 and the probabilities conditional on health are {θ(j+1, h)}Jj=R+1. We assume that,
at each age j, the probability of entering a nursing home next period increases in M(j, h) at
a constant rate or
ln θ(j + 1, h) = βjn,1 + β
j
n,2 lnM(j, h), j = R + 1, . . . , J.
For simplicity we assume that the rate at which the entry probability increases with health
is constant across ages, i.e., βjn,2 = βn,2 for all j > R. In addition, we assume that the uncon-
ditional probability of entering a nursing home is the same across agents within the following
age groups: 65 to 74, 75 to 84, and 85 years old and above. Thus, given βn,2, the parameters
{βjn,1}Jj=R+1 are chosen such that the unconditional nursing home entry probabilities satisfy
θ¯j =

θ¯65−74, for 1 ≤ R + j < 6,
θ¯75−84, for 6 ≤ R + j < 11,
θ¯85+, for 11 ≤ R + j ≤ J,
and the 3 probabilities, θ¯65−74, θ¯75−84, and θ¯85+, target the percentage of nursing homes
residents in each age group. According to the U.S. Census special tabulation for 2000, these
percentages were 1.1, 4.7, and 18.2, respectively. The growth rate βn,2 is chosen along with
the parameters of the medical expense process by targeting Medicaid’s share of medical
expenses by age.
The medical cost of 2 years of nursing home care in the model economy, Mn targets
the share of total nursing home expenses in GDP. According to statistics drawn from the
Medicare Current Beneficiary Surveys from the period 2000 to 2003, the average cost of
nursing home care net of Medicare payments was 0.68 percent of GDP. Note that in the
model, total nursing home expenses are computed as the sum of the medical costs and
consumption in a nursing home: Mn + cn.
4.3.3 Survival Probabilities
Recall that while agents of age j = R + 1, . . . , J not residing in a nursing home have
probability sj+1 of surviving to age j + 1 conditional on having survived to age j, retired
agents residing in nursing homes face different survival probabilities, given by {snj }Jj=R+2.
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These two sets of survival probabilities are not set to match their counterparts in the data
for two reasons: first, there are no estimates of survival probabilities by nursing home status
available for the U.S., and second, since we are targeting statistics on aggregate nursing
home costs, it is important for the model to be consistent with the data on nursing home
usage. Therefore, the survival probabilities are set as follows. First, we assume that for each
cohort, the probability of surviving to the next age while in a nursing home is a constant
fraction of the probability of surviving to the next age outside of a nursing home:
snj = φ
nsj, for j = R + 2, . . . , J.
Then we pin-down the value of φn by targeting the fraction of individuals aged 65 and over
residing in nursing homes in the U.S. in 2000 subject to the restriction that the unconditional
age-specific survival probabilities are consistent with those observed in the data.5 According
to U.S. Census special tabulation for 2000, the fraction of the 65 plus population in a nursing
home in 2000 was 4.5 percent.
4.3.4 Government
The government-run welfare program in the model economy guarantees agents a minimum
consumption level. The welfare program, which is available to all agents regardless of age,
represents public assistance programs in the U.S. such as food stamps, Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, Supplemental Social Security Income, and Medicaid. Since estimates
of the government-guaranteed consumption levels for working versus retired individuals are
found to be very similar, we assume that they are the same. However, the consumption
level provided by the government differs for nursing home versus medical bankruptcy. In
the literature, estimates of the consumption level for a family consisting of one adult and
two children is approximately 35 percent of expected average annual lifetime earnings, while
the minimum level for retired households has been estimated to be in the range of 15 to
20 percent (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994) and Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun
(2006)).6 These estimates suggest that the minimum consumption floor for individuals is
somewhere in the range of 10 to 20 percent.7 We set the consumption floor for consumer
5The data on survival probabilities is taken from Table 7 of Life Tables for the United States Social
Security Area 1900-2100 Actuarial Study No. 116 and are weighted averages of the probabilities for both
men and women born in 1950.
6Expected average annual lifetime earnings in 1999 is computed as a weighted average of estimates of
average lifetime earnings for different education groups taken from The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment
and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings. U.S. Census Bureau Special Studies. July 2002. The
weights are taken from Educational Attainment: 2000 Census Brief. August 2003.
7However, this statement should be taken with caution. The consumption floor is difficult to measure
due to the large variation and complexity in welfare programs and their coverage. In addition, families
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and medical bankruptcy, cw = cm, to 15 percent of the average value of the agents’ expected
average lifetime earnings.
Obtaining an estimate of a consumption floor provided under a nursing home bankruptcy
is problematic because it requires estimating the value of the rooms and amenities that
nursing homes provide to Medicaid-funded residents. Instead, we calibrate the minimum
consumption level for nursing home residents, cn, to match Medicaid’s share of nursing
home expenses for individuals 65 and over. According to the Current Medicare Beneficiary
Survey, over the period 2000 to 2003, on average, Medicaid’s share of the elderly’s total
nursing home expenses net of those paid by Medicare was approximately 45 percent.
The social security benefit function in the model captures the progressivity of the U.S.
social security system by making the marginal replacement rate decrease with average life-
time earnings. Following Fuster, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006), the marginal tax
replacement rate is 90 percent for earnings below 20 percent of the economy’s average life-
time earnings E¯, 33 percent for earnings above that threshold but below 125 percent of E¯,
and 15 percent for earnings beyond that up to 246 percent of E¯. There is no replacement
for earnings beyond 246 percent of E¯. Hence the payment function is
S(e¯) =

s1e¯, for e¯ ≤ τ1,
s1τ1 + s2(e¯− τ1), for τ1 ≤ e¯ ≤ τ2,
s1τ1 + s2(τ2 − τ1) + s3(e¯− τ2), for τ2 ≤ e¯ ≤ τ3,
s1τ1 + s2(τ2 − τ1) + s3(τ3 − τ2), for e¯ ≥ τ3.
where the marginal replacement rates, s1, s2, and s3 are set to 0.90, 0.33, and 0.15, respec-
tively. While the threshold levels, τ1, τ2, and τ3, are set respectively to 20 percent, 125
percent and 246 percent of the economy’s average lifetime earnings.
The payroll tax which is used to fund the social security system is assumed to be pro-
portional, thus
τe(e) = τˆee,
where the tax rate τˆe is determined in equilibrium. Likewise, income taxes in the model
economy are assumed to be proportional so that
τy(y) = τˆyy.
with two adults and adults under 65 without children would receive substantially less in benefits then found
above. Consistent with this, by estimating their model, DeNardi, French, and Jones (2006), find a much
lower minimum consumption level: approximately 8 percent of expected average annual lifetime earnings.
This is similar to a value of about 6 percent used by Palumbo (1999). However, health expenses in the
model of DeNardi et al. include nursing home costs, and hence their estimate is not directly comparable to
the non-nursing home minimum consumption level in our model. Thus we do not use their estimate.
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The tax rate τˆy is also determined in equilibrium. As is the case under the U.S. tax system,
taxable income is income net of health expenses that exceed 7.5 percent of income. Thus κ
is set to 0.075. Finally, government spending, G is set such that, in equilibrium, government
spending as a fraction of output is 19 percent.
4.4 Baseline calibration
The model parametrization is summarized in Table 6. Information on the algorithm used to
compute the equilibrium along with the transition probability matrices and other parameters
governing the earnings and OOP health expense processes are included in the Appendix.
The benchmark model performance relative to calibration targets is discussed in the next
section. The equilibrium tax rates in the benchmark economy are 0.254 for income tax
and 0.079 for payroll tax. Note that our calibration produced a value for the nursing home
consumption floor, cn, which lies below the non-nursing home consumption floor, cm. We
view this differential as reflecting a lower quality of life enjoyed in a public nursing home
facility relative to receiving public assistance while living at home. As we show later in our
quantitative analysis, the low quality of life under public nursing care plays an important
role in individual saving decisions.
5 Life-cycle Theory of Inequality
Building a life-cycle theory of economic inequality is crucial for a social insurance policy
analysis for many reasons. To name a few, first, social safety nets target the low-income
population. Second, different sources of uncertainty potentially induce differential saving
responses across the permanent earnings distribution. Finally, when wealth is highly con-
centrated in the hands of a few, their saving behavior has large consequences for the whole
economy.
In this section we first discuss the performance of the benchmark economy with respect
to the data targets outlined in the calibration section. We then assess the ability of the
calibrated model to generate cross-sectional and life-cycle wealth inequality as observed in the
U.S. economy and examine the contribution of precautionary savings to wealth accumulation
and inequality.
The exogeneity of the earnings distribution allows us to match it with a much greater
precision then other sources of heterogeneity in the model economy. Since the contribution
of our analysis comes from modeling medical and nursing home expense risk, we confine our
discussion to the latter, while reporting the fit of the earnings distribution in the Appendix.
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Table 6: Calibrated Parameters
parameter description values
β subjective discount factor 0.954∗
γ coefficient of risk aversion 2.0
n population growth rate 0.021
consumption floors
cw consumer bankruptcy 0.15†
cm medical bankruptcy 0.15†
cn nursing home bankruptcy 0.09†
Mn medical cost of nursing home care 0.86†
φn
relative survival probability
for nursing home residents
0.919
probabilities of entering a nursing home in next 2 years
θ¯65−74 65 to 74 year-olds 0.004
θ¯75−84 75 to 84 year-olds 0.0136
θ¯85+ 85 and up 0.0551
βn,2 growth rate of nursing home prob. with medical expenses 0.938
coefficients in the deterministic component of medical expenses
βm,1 age 0.13
βm,2 age-squared −0.0058
A TFP in production 1.17
α capital’s share of output 0.3
δ capital’s deprecation rate 0.07
∗All numbers are annual unless otherwise noted.
†Fraction of expected average annual lifetime earnings.
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5.1 Medical and Nursing Home Expenses
In the data, individual medical expenses are observed only net of public subsidies. Hence
we calibrate the stochastic process for total medical and nursing home expenses to match
aggregate levels of OOP health expenses and their observed distribution across the popu-
lation. In particular, we target the cross-sectional distribution of OOP expenses, shares of
OOP and Medicaid expenses in GDP by age group, and the distribution of OOP expenses by
social security income. Moreover, the nursing home expense process targets the distribution
of nursing home residents and aggregate nursing home costs by source of payment. The
results of the calibration procedure are presented in Table 7. Overall, the distribution of
OOP health expenses in the benchmark economy closely replicates a wide range of data mo-
ments. Table 8 summarizes the cross-sectional targets from Table 7 into aggregate statistics
for the benchmark economy, showing a good model fit with the data on aggregate. Among
the independent moments characterizing health expenses, the model successfully predicts the
fraction of nursing home residents receiving Medicaid subsidy and the probability of entering
a nursing home for a long-term stay.
5.2 Wealth Inequality
Before proceeding to the model predictions about wealth inequality under the benchmark
calibration, it is useful to discuss the driving forces behind wealth inequality in the model. In
the model economy, individuals face uncertainty about their earnings, medical and nursing
home expenses, and survival. The absence of insurance markets coupled with borrowing con-
straints creates a strong incentive for precautionary saving as individuals desire to smooth
consumption over their lifetime. Means-testing of social insurance implies that richer individ-
uals rely on self-insurance through private savings much more than poorer ones. The welfare
program discourages saving of low-income workers early on in life, and Medicaid further
discourages their saving to finance health expenses experienced later on. As an agent’s per-
manent earnings increase, he becomes less likely to qualify for Medicaid, and health expenses
gain importance in his life-cycle savings. However, the relative importance of medical versus
nursing home expenses for saving differs across the permanent earnings distribution. Note
that, as the most persistent and one of the largest health expense realizations in the model
economy, nursing home expenses require a higher level of savings than medical expenses. As
a result, for low-income individuals, saving for nursing home expenses is either infeasible or
relatively more costly than for wealthier individuals. Hence low-income individuals are more
likely to allow Medicaid to cover their nursing home care costs, saving instead for smaller
OOP medical expenses. Saving behavior of wealthier individuals, on the other hand, is driven
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Table 7: Distribution of Medical and Nursing Home Expenses by Source of Payment
Targeted Moments Data Model Data Model
OOP Expenses
Gini 0.67 0.68
Shares of Total, %
First Quintile 0.13 0.10
Second Quintile 2.75 2.60
Third Quintile 9.76 9.32
Fourth Quintile 20.16 20.79
Fifth Quintile 67.21 67.19
Top 10% 50.71 50.47
Top 5% 38.84 40.57
Top 1% 21.77 14.45
Shares and Mean Expenses of SSI groups shares, % mean, % p.c. income
First Quintile 13.4 2.7 17 1
Second Quintile 16.7 18.1 21 17
Third Quintile 18.4 23.3 23 22
Fourth Quintile 23.0 27.5 29 26
Fifth Quintile 28.5 28.3 36 26
Top 10% 7.5 14.2
Top 5% 6.5 7.2
Top 1% 1.4 1.4
Shares of GDP by Age, %
65-74 0.61 0.63
75-84 0.55 0.51
85+ 0.34 0.32
Medicaid
Shares of GDP by Age, %
65-74 0.17 0.18
75-84 0.23 0.22
85+ 0.23 0.24
Nursing Home
Costs
Share of GDP, % 0.68 0.69
Share of Total Health Expenses, % 33 33
Medicaid Share of NH Costs, % 45 44
Resident Share in Age Group, %
65+ 4.5 4.7
65-74 1.1 1.0
75-84 4.7 4.7
85+ 18.2 18.2
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Table 8: Medical and Nursing Home Expenses: Aggregate Summary
Health Expense Data Model
Medical
OOP, % of GDP 1.5 1.5
Medicaid, % of GDP 0.6 0.6
Nursing Home
OOP, % of GDP, % 0.38 0.39
Medicaid, % of GDP 0.31 0.30
Independent Moments
Fraction of NH residents on Medicaid 0.58∗ 0.60
Nursing Home Entry Probability 0.14† 0.15
∗ includes individuals under 65
† probability of entering and staying a year or more
by both medical and nursing home expenses. Moreover, self-insurance against the nursing
home shock by wealthier individuals is in part driven by the relatively lower consumption
floor guaranteed under a nursing home bankruptcy which makes this type of bankruptcy
relatively more painful. In summary, individuals across the permanent earnings distribution
effectively face different kinds of OOP health expense risk and this variation has a signif-
icant impact on the distribution of wealth in the economy. Another factor important to
the distribution of wealth in the model economy is the fact that progressive social security
provides better insurance against health expense and survival risk for the poor than the
rich. The importance of different types of OOP health expenses and the structure of the
social insurance system for aggregate wealth accumulation and inequality is a quantitative
question we seek to answer.
To assess the model’s fitness to address this question, we compare the wealth inequality
generated by the model to the data. Recall that our calibration procedure did not target
any wealth distribution moments. Table 9 reveals that cross-sectional wealth inequality in
the benchmark economy has a remarkable fit of the U.S. wealth distribution, as documented
in Rodriguez et al. (2002). The share of wealth help by the top 1 percent of the population
in the model economy, 28 percent, is remarkably high for a pure overlapping-generations
model. Moreover, the wealth Gini in the benchmark economy is U-shaped over the life-cycle
(Figure 1a), which is consistent with the pattern observed in the data (Huggett (1996)). The
rise in wealth inequality at the end of the life-cycle is driven by uncertain lifetimes.
In an empirical analysis, Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) document that the saving
rates of working age households increase with current and permanent income. We compute
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Table 9: Wealth: Selected Moments
Moments Data Model
Wealth†
Gini 0.80 0.83
shares of total, %
First Quintile -0.3 0
Second Quintile 1.3 0
Third Quintile 5.0 1.0
Fourth Quintile 12.2 12.9
Fifth Quintile 81.7 86.0
Top 10% 69.1 66.8
Top 5% 57.8 51.7
Top 1% 34.7 28.0
† Data source: Rodriguez et al. (2002).
the saving rates for each earnings quintile by age as the ratio of the change in asset holdings
of a quintile to the current disposable income of that quintile. Figure 1b shows that in the
benchmark economy, for the first four quintiles, individuals in the higher permanent earnings
quintiles save a higher fraction of their current disposable income. Individuals in the highest
permanent earnings quintile have the highest average saving rate up until age 40.
5.3 Precautionary Savings Due to Old-Age Uncertainty
How large is the contribution of precautionary savings due to uncertainty about health
expenses and survival to aggregate savings? To address this question we conduct a few
partial equilibrium experiments. To evaluate the role of health expense risk, we shut down
uncertainty about all health expenses by making each retired individual face a deterministic
health expense profile regardless of their nursing home status. The expense profile is set
to the average profile before Medicaid subsidies in the benchmark economy. Note that
uncertainty about health expenses due to random survival still remains. Consistently with
De Nardi et al. (2006) and Hubbard et al. (1994), we find that, on aggregate, health
expense risk plays a relatively minor role: precautionary savings account for 4 percent of the
total capital stock (Table 10). Not surprisingly, given the high concentration of wealth in the
model economy, health expense risk is more important on the individual level. Precautionary
savings of the fourth and fifth permanent earnings quintiles account for 8 and 5 percent of
their wealth respectively. The aggregate effect is smaller because individuals in the lower
quintiles accumulate more wealth with deterministic health expenses as they are less likely
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to qualify for Medicaid subsidies in the absence of large shocks.
Notice, however, that although all quintiles face higher OOP health expenses due to a
lower Medicaid subsidy (for which they qualify with certainty after some age), their OOP
nursing home expenses drop. To disentangle the contribution of the nursing home expense
risk to savings from that of the medical expenses, we consider an economy where every
retired individual faces certain medical expenses but their nursing home expense risk is the
same as in the benchmark economy. We find that uncertainty about medical expenses alone
accounts for only 1 percent of aggregate capital accumulation, driven by the savings of the
top two quintiles (second column in Table 10). We conclude that uncertainty about nursing
home expenses is a more important motive for precautionary savings than uncertainty about
medical expenses. The intuition behind this novel result in the literature is simple: the
nursing home shock is the most persistent shock, one of the largest health cost realizations
in the model economy, and the least insured by the government. These three features make
nursing home expenses more risky than medical expenses.
To assess the contribution of precautionary savings due to survival risk, we consider
certain lifetimes conditional on nursing home status. That is, since nursing home entry is
random, and it lowers the entrant’s life expectancy, survival risk due to nursing home entry
still remains. We set the lifetime horizon of an individual who never enters a nursing home
equal to the life-expectancy of the same individual in the benchmark economy. Individuals
who enter nursing homes live to an age given by the life expectancy conditional on entering
a nursing home at age 65 in the benchmark economy. Entering a nursing home after that
age is equivalent to an immediate death.
We find that survival risk plays a much more prominent role in savings than health
expense risk. Precautionary savings due to survival risk accounts for 15 percent of the capital
stock in the benchmark economy. Why is survival risk so important for savings given that
social security already partially insures individuals against this type of risk? This happens for
two reasons. First, social security income is insufficient for consumption smoothing of richer
individuals, and second, the presence of health expenses and their growth with age make
surviving increase lifetime health expense risk. Means-testing of Medicaid makes this risk
more important for wealthier individuals. As Table 10 shows, deterministic survival leads
to a decrease in the wealth of the top three permanent earnings quintiles. Notice, however,
that part of the fall in their wealth is due to a decline in their OOP health expenses. This
decline occurs because no one lives to ages beyond life expectancy – when health expenses
are, on average, the highest.
How much do health expenses matter for the importance of survival risk? To this end,
we repeat the above experiment in an economy identical to the benchmark except with
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Table 10: Effects of Old-Age Uncertainty
Health Expenses Deterministic Det. except NH Random None
Survival Random Random Deterministic Deterministic
relative to baseline
relative to random survival
and no health expenses
Agg. Capital 0.961 0.989 0.847 0.948
wealth of PI quintiles
First Quintile 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.06
Second Quintile 1.16 1.07 1.00 1.07
Third Quintile 1.04 1.00 0.89 1.02
Fourth Quintile 0.92 0.97 0.81 0.99
Fifth Quintile 0.95 0.99 0.88 0.95
OOP expenses of PI quintiles
First Quintile 1.24 1.20 0.99
Second Quintile 1.33 1.19 1.03
Third Quintile 1.21 1.06 0.98
Fourth Quintile 1.04 1.01 0.89
Fifth Quintile 1.01 1.00 0.88
Nursing home OOP expenses of PI quintiles
First Quintile 0.95 1.03 0.42
Second Quintile 0.77 1.09 0.49
Third Quintile 0.53 1.06 0.46
Fourth Quintile 0.34 1.02 0.38
Fifth Quintile 0.31 1.00 0.36
all health expenses removed. The change in the aggregate wealth is reported in the last
column in Table 10. Without health expenses, precautionary savings due to survival risk only
account for 5 percent of the aggregate capital stock. Moreover, precautionary savings are only
accumulated by the top permanent earnings quintile; the rest of the population gets enough
insurance from the social security system. We thus conclude that, although health expense
risk conditional on survival generates little precautionary savings, the presence of health
expenses substantially amplifies the role of survival risk in individual wealth accumulation.
This is another novel result in the literature.
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5.4 Medicaid
Our model allows us to examine the differential amount of insurance provided by Medicaid.
Figure 2a shows that the number of Medicaid recipients increases with age as savings get
depleted toward the end of the life cycle. The major beneficiaries of the Medicaid program
are in the bottom 20 percent of the permanent earnings distribution. Similarly, Figure 2b
shows that the main nursing home beneficiaries of Medicaid are those in the bottom 40
percent of the permanent earnings distribution and older individuals from higher quintiles.
Note that the take up rate of Medicaid is much higher among nursing home residents. This
occurs for two reasons. First, the nursing home expense shock is one of the largest in the
benchmark economy and is an absorbing state. As a result, nursing home residents quickly
deplete their assets and qualify for Medicaid sooner than the general population. Second,
the probability of entering a nursing home next period is increasing in agents’ current period
medical expense shock. Hence nursing home residents are more likely than the rest of the
population to have incurred high medical expenses in the past that have depleted their
savings increasing their likelihood of Medicaid eligibility.
Finally, Figure 3a shows the distribution of OOP health expenses by permanent earnings
quintile and age. The first quintile faces on average 5 times smaller OOP health expenses
than the second quintile. This gap indicates that the lifetime earnings of individuals in the
bottom quintile are so low that a majority of them cannot afford most of their medical costs
even outside of a nursing home, having to rely on Medicaid subsidies. Similarly, a substantial
fraction of individuals in the second permanent earnings quintile cannot afford nursing home
costs but pay for smaller medical expenses OOP. Higher quintiles, on the other hand, pay
nursing home expenses OOP in addition to medical expenses. Furthermore, as a result of the
means-testing of Medicaid, expected OOP health expenses relative to income are the highest
for individuals in the middle of the permanent earnings distribution. Figure 3b shows that
permanent earnings quintiles two, three, and four expect the largest health expenses relative
to their current incomes. These differences in OOP expenses across the permanent earnings
distribution will help us to understand the differential responses of individuals to the policy
changes discussed below.
6 Public Policy Analysis
The policy analysis presented in this section has two goals: 1) to assess the contribution
of medical and nursing home expenses to aggregate capital accumulation and wealth in-
equality, and 2) to evaluate aggregate and distributional consequences of alternative social
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insurance policies. To this end, we consider three types of policy experiments. In the first
set of experiments, we introduce public health care such that medical and/or nursing home
expenses are fully covered by the government. In the second set of experiments, we vary the
availability of safety nets for different types of bankruptcies. In the third set of experiments,
we vary social security policy from progressive to proportional to none. All the experiments
considered below are revenue-neutral in a sense that government consumption remains fixed
at the benchmark level.
6.1 Public Health Care
Before proceeding to the discussion of public health care policies, we would like to clarify our
terminology. It is important to remember that Medicaid transfers to nursing home residents
combine consumption and medical expense subsidies, up to cn + Mn in the benchmark
economy. When we refer to the public coverage of nursing home expenses, or equivalently,
elimination of nursing home expenses, we mean only the medical expense portion, Mn, of
the nursing home cost. Unlike under Medicaid, this subsidy is provided to all nursing home
residents, and it does not restrict their consumption to cn. Consumption transfers to nursing
home residents are subject to means-testing in all policies that we consider below, including
those with public coverage of nursing home care.
To examine the role of medical and nursing home expenses jointly and in isolation, we
consider three public health care policies: (1) government covers all medical expenses but
does not cover nursing home expenses, (2) government covers nursing home expenses only,
(3) government covers all health expenses. Under the first policy, social insurance for nursing
home residents is unchanged, while the medical expenses of the rest of the population are
paid by the government. Under the second policy, the government pays for the medical
expenses of all nursing home residents regardless of their income, while the social insurance
coverage of all other health expenses is as in the benchmark economy. Finally, under the
third policy both medical and nursing home expenses are paid for by the government. Under
all 3 policies consumption transfers are subject to the same means tests as in the benchmark
economy. Aggregate and distributional effects of each policy are reported in Table 11.
Introducing public health care greatly reduces saving incentives. Our model predicts
that a complete elimination of health expenses (policy 3) would reduce the aggregate capital
stock by 12 percent. To show the importance of the general equilibrium analysis, we repeat
the same experiment in a partial equilibrium. We find that changes in after-tax prices –
specifically an increase in the after-tax interest rate – offset the decline in the capital stock
by 7 percentage points.
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To understand which health expenses − medical or nursing home − drive the impact of
public health care on capital accumulation, we compare the effects of policies 1 and 2, which
eliminate one type of expense at a time. Note that policy 2 does not completely eliminate
the nursing home risk per se as it is still present in the survival probabilities, which are
lower for the nursing home residents. We find that in a general equilibrium, on aggregate,
both types of expenses contribute equally: elimination of either non-nursing home expenses
only or nursing home expenses only reduces the capital stock by 7.5 percent relative to
the benchmark. In a partial equilibrium, nursing home expenses have a larger effect than
medical expenses, accounting for 10 percent of the capital stock compared to 7.6 percent.
The relative importance of the nursing home expenses for capital accumulation may seem
surprising given that their share of total health expenses is only 20 percent (see Table 8).
However, we have shown in Section 5.3 that, in part, nursing home expenses play a larger
role because of their higher risk relative to medical expenses.
The larger difference between the partial and general equilibrium capital stocks under
policy 2 compared to policy 1 is due to a difference in the saving response to the higher
interest rate in general equilibrium under the two different policies. Removing the risk of
OOP expenses lowers the risk of additional savings being implicitly taxed-away through
means-tested transfers. However removing OOP nursing home expenses reduces the implicit
tax risk more than removing OOP medical expenses. Under policy 1, savings are less elastic
in response to the higher interest rate than under policy 2. In addition, medical expenses are
four times larger than nursing home expenses. Thus the government must raise the income
tax rate to finance policy 1 further discouraging savings. Under policy 3, the removal of
all OOP health expenses greatly reduces implicit tax risk, making the savings response to
rising interest rates even more elastic. The consequent increase in aggregate savings and tax
revenue is sufficient to finance the increase in government spending on health expenses with
only a tiny increase in the income tax rate.
Given the large aggregate effect of medical and nursing home expenses on capital accu-
mulation, the following question arises: What part of the population reduces their savings
the most in response to the policy changes? Recall that the major savers in the benchmark
economy are located in the top two permanent earnings quintiles. Table 11 provides a break-
down of the change in the aggregate capital stock by changes in the asset holdings of each
quintile. We find that in absolute terms, the asset holdings of the top quintile decline the
most across all three policy experiments, accounting for a third to a half of the drop in the
aggregate capital stock. This is a result of the differential provision of social insurance across
the permanent earnings distribution: the rich – the least insured in the benchmark economy
– face the largest change in insurance coverage and hence respond the most to public health
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care.
However, in percentage terms, relative to the quintile’s wealth in the benchmark economy,
asset holdings of agents in the middle of the permanent earnings distribution – quintiles two
to four – respond the most. Under policy 3, these quintiles reduce their wealth by 20
percent whereas the wealth of the first quintile is unaffected and the top quintile reduces
its wealth by only 8 percent. Figure 4a plots the wealth profiles of the fourth quintile
under alternative policies. Notice that public health care discourages individual savings well
before retirement. Although before retirement, savings respond similarly to public coverage
of medical and nursing home expenses, after retirement the response to the two policies is
dramatically different. Whereas medical expense coverage merely flattens the savings profile
between ages 50 and 80, public coverage of nursing home expenses creates strong dissaving
incentives at all ages after retirement. In fact, the wealth profile under public coverage of
only nursing home expenses lies very close to the wealth profile under public coverage of all
health expenses.
Moreover, as Table 11 indicates, nursing home expenses have a bigger impact than med-
ical expenses on the saving behavior of the top two permanent earnings quintiles, and the
reverse is true for the second and third quintiles. These differences in the quintiles’ saving
responses to policy changes are consistent with the findings and intuition in the previous
section: that is, different earnings quintiles are primarily exposed to different kinds of OOP
expenses, and hence respond the most to the elimination of their particular expenses. Fur-
thermore, between the two quintiles exposed the most to the nursing home expense risk,
the fourth quintile reduces its wealth by a higher fraction than does the fifth quintile. This
occurs because, relative to their lifetime earnings, the fourth quintile’s OOP nursing home
expenses are larger.
One of the motivations for incorporating OOP medical and nursing home expenses into
a life-cycle model was the inability of standard life-cycle models to generate low dissaving
rates at old ages without resorting to a bequest motive. Our public health care experiments
allow us to examine the contribution of medical and nursing home expenses to the dissaving
rates of the elderly. Figure 4b shows these rates for the fourth quintile, as the responses to
policy changes are the most dramatic for this population group. Under public coverage of
medical expenses, individuals ages 65 to 75 dissave at a nearly half the rate in the benchmark
economy, while public coverage of nursing home expenses increases the rate of dissaving
relative to the benchmark. We conclude that it is the nursing home and not medical expenses
that slow down wealth depletion after retirement.
Finally, we find that the introduction of public health care – public coverage of nursing
home expenses in particular – dramatically increases within-cohort wealth inequality among
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retired individuals (Figure 5a), in spite of having only a small effect on overall cross-sectional
inequality (Table 11). At the end of the life cycle, the wealth Gini coefficient increases by
as much as 20 points. Higher inequality without health expense risk would appear rather
surprising had we not already discussed the differential response of savings to the policy
changes across the permanent earnings quintiles. As the top quintile experiences a smaller
drop in its wealth relative to the second, third, and fourth quintiles, its share of aggregate
wealth is bound to rise. Notice that prior to the age of 86 years, OOP medical expenses
dominate nursing home expenses in reducing wealth inequality, while at later ages their roles
are reversed. This is explained by the fact that nursing home risk grows substantially with
age: under the benchmark calibration, the probability of entering a nursing home after age
85 is more than triple the probability for ages 75 to 84. Moreover, while we find that public
health care reduces consumption inequality, the effect is substantial only among those 85
years and older (Figure 5b). Since these are the people most likely to enter a nursing home,
it is not surprising that coverage of the nursing home expenses drives the fall in consumption
inequality.
To understand why nursing home expenses play such an important role in capital ac-
cumulation, we also consider a social insurance policy that does not discriminate between
bankruptcies, i.e. it guarantees the same consumption floor to nursing home residents as the
rest of the population receives in the benchmark economy: cn = cm. We term this ‘qual-
ity’ nursing home care. We repeat policy experiments (1) through (3) in the economy with
quality nursing home care. The results are presented in Table 12.
Quality public nursing home care reduces ‘Medicaid aversion’, i.e. incentives of the middle
class to avoid public care. Precautionary savings fall and the capital stock declines by 4
percent relative to the benchmark economy. Next, we introduce public health care into
the economy with quality nursing home care. Elimination of OOP health expenses in this
economy reduces the capital stock by 9 percent, which is 3 percentage points less than
the effect of the same policy in the benchmark economy. Moreover, in contrast to the
impact of public health care programs without quality nursing homes, quality public nursing
home care reduces the relative importance of nursing home expenses for savings. While
elimination of OOP medical expenses reduces the capital stock by 8 percent, elimination
of OOP nursing home expenses reduces it by only 4 percent. That is, a higher level of
public insurance for nursing home expenses makes nursing home bankruptcy less painful,
reducing the desire to avoid it with self-insurance. The relative impacts of health expenses
on savings are also illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the wealth profiles of the fourth
permanent earnings quintile under the different policies. Unlike in Figure 4a, with quality
nursing homes, the wealth profile under the publicly-funded nursing home care lies very
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Table 11: Effects of Public Health Care Policies
Policy Baseline 1 2 3
Medical Expenses OOP Public OOP Public
Nursing Home Expenses OOP OOP Public Public
Aggregates
relative to baseline
Agg. Output 1.00 0.977 0.977 0.962
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.925 0.925 0.878
Capital, Partial Equil. 0.924 0.902 0.810
change in wealth of PE quintiles, % of agg. capital change
All 100 100 100
First Quintile 0.7 -0.1 0.0
Second Quintile 13.2 -0.3 6.0
Third Quintile 21.7 7.6 15.3
Fourth Quintile 26.8 37.9 35.0
Fifth Quintile 36.0 49.6 39.6
wealth of PE quintiles relative to baseline
First Quintile 1.00 0.87 1.02 1.00
Second Quintile 1.00 0.72 1.01 0.80
Third Quintile 1.00 0.82 0.94 0.80
Fourth Quintile 1.00 0.91 0.87 0.80
Fifth Quintile 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.92
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.271 0.259 0.257
OOP, % output 1.46 0.40 1.15 0.06†
Std(OOP) (rel.) 1.00 0.74 0.73 0.10
Wealth Inequality
Wealth Gini 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.84
shares of total wealth, %
Fourth Quintile 12.9 11.5 13.1 11.9
Fifth Quintile 86.1 87.7 85.8 87.2
Top 10% 66.8 68.9 67.9 69.8
Top 5% 51.7 54.0 53.8 56.0
Top 1% 28.0 30.0 30.0 31.7
† OOP expenses are positive because, to make our measure of nursing home expenses more consistent with
the measure used in the data, we include a consumption component that is not covered under policies 1-3.
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Table 12: Effects of Higher Nursing Home Insurance and Public Health Care Policies
Policy Baseline Quality NH 1(Q) 2(Q) 3(Q)
Medical Expenses OOP OOP Public OOP Public
Nursing Home Expenses OOP (Q)OOP (Q)OOP (Q)Public (Q)Public
Aggregates
relative to baseline
Agg. Output 1.00 0.988 0.965 0.977 0.962
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.962 0.887 0.925 0.877
relative to Quality NH
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.922 0.961 0.912
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.259 0.277 0.260 0.257
OOP, % output 1.47 1.47 0.39 1.19 0.10
Std(OOP) (rel.) 1.00 0.99 0.73 0.74 0.16
close to the profile without the coverage. We conclude that higher wealth accumulation for
nursing home expenses relative to that for medical expenses is for the most part accounted
for by the differential insurance of nursing home versus medical bankruptcies.
6.2 Social Safety Nets
In this section, we examine the role of social safety nets in wealth accumulation and in-
equality. In our model economy, the welfare program for workers and Medicaid for retirees
partially insure against earnings, survival, and health expense risks by providing means-
tested transfers that guarantee a minimum consumption level. As means-tested Medicaid
transfers effectively tax away savings, they discourage savings disproportionally more for
poor individuals, reducing aggregate capital accumulation and increasing wealth inequality.
To examine the role of each safety net quantitatively, we consider five more policies, labeled
4 through 8, which (almost completely) remove welfare and/or Medicaid programs. This
is achieved by setting consumption floors for workers and/or retirees to a very small value,
while leaving all other features of the benchmark economy unchanged. To learn the contri-
bution of health expenses to the effects of safety nets, we consider policies, labeled 7 and 8,
which not only remove safety nets, but also eliminate all OOP health expenses through pub-
lic health care. The aggregate and distributional effects of policies 4 through 8 are presented
in Table 13. Note that the safety net labeled ‘Medicaid’ also includes the old-age welfare
program.
41
Table 13: Effects of Safety Nets With and Without OOP Health Expenses
Policies Baseline 4 5 6 7 8
Safety Nets In Place All Medicaid Welfare None Medicaid None
Public Health Care No No No No Yes Yes
Aggregates
relative to baseline
Agg. Output 1.00 1.097 1.278 1.290 1.056 1.064
Agg. Capital 1.00 1.360 2.264 2.339 1.199 1.231
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.224 0.187 0.176 0.253 0.223
Transfers, % output 2.8 0.8 0.9 0.2 0.2 0
OOP, % output 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 0 0
Std(OOP) (rel.) 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 0 0
Consumption Gini 0.42 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.43 0.49
Wealth Inequality
Wealth Gini 0.83 0.66 0.57 0.55 0.84 0.64
shares of total wealth, %
Fourth Quintile 12.9 18.9 26.1 25.9 12.1 18.9
Fifth Quintile 86.1 66.7 55.5 54.4 86.7 65.1
Top 1% 28.0 20.7 12.8 12.4 31.4 22.5
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In all the economies we consider here, agents are still partially insured through the
progressive social security program against all three types of risk. Apart from this insurance,
policy 4 maximizes individual exposure to earnings risk by removing the welfare program
for workers, policy 5 maximizes individual exposure to health expense and survival risk
by removing Medicaid and the old-age welfare program, and policy 6 maximizes individual
exposure to all three types of risks by removing all the welfare and Medicaid programs. Extra
risk and higher expected OOP health expenses create strong incentives for precautionary
savings across all income levels. In the economy with the most risk (policy 6), the capital
stock increases by 134 percent. Which safety nets – those for workers or the elderly – are
responsible for the large decrease in precautionary savings, going from policy 6 back to the
baseline? Policies 4 and 5 provide the answer: while removing the welfare program for
workers (policy 5) in the benchmark economy increases the capital stock by 36 percent,
removing the welfare program for the elderly (policy 4) increases the capital stock by 126
percent.
Why is the health expense risk a more important driver of precautionary savings than
the earnings risk? The answer lies in the timing of the two types of shocks. Individuals
accumulate savings during the working stage of life in order to self-insure against health
expense shocks experienced after retirement. These precautionary savings present a sufficient
buffer against earnings shocks before retirement. That is, consumption smoothing over the
working stage of life requires nearly no extra savings. This would not have been the case
were the two types of shocks experienced simultaneously.
Now we examine the impact of the public safety nets in the presence of OOP health
expense risk on wealth inequality. Removing social safety nets for all or some types of risk
reduces inequality by stimulating savings across the entire permanent earnings distribution.
However, as discussed in the previous section, the presence of OOP health expenses creates a
differential savings response across the permanent earnings distribution. Since in the absence
of safety nets the poor face higher health expenses relative to their lifetime earnings, they
increase their savings by a higher fraction than do the rich. This wealth redistribution effect
further reduces wealth inequality. In the economy with the least insurance (policy 6), the
wealth Gini falls by 28 percentage points relative to the benchmark. Once again, comparing
inequality measures under policies 4 and 5 shows that among the three types of risk, health
expense together with survival risk account for most of the reduction in wealth inequality.
Finally, comparing this change with the reduction in the wealth Gini caused by going from
policy 7 to 8 (removing safety net for retirees under full public health care) shows that the
differential response to the pure increase in survival risk alone accounts for some but not all
of the reduction in the wealth Gini coefficient. We conclude that the Medicaid program is
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an important generater of overall cross-sectional wealth inequality. Finally, both welfare and
Medicaid reduce overall consumption inequality: the Gini coefficient decreases by 6-7 points
for each program, and by 11 points in a joint effect.
6.3 Social Security
In this section we examine the effects of social security policy on savings in the presence of
health expenses and Medicaid. The social security system crowds out savings for old age by
redistributing resources from working years to retirement years. In addition, it crowds out
precautionary savings by insuring against survival risk in the form of an annuity payment.
The question we ask here is does the presence of health expenses at old age matter for the
crowding out effect and how much? Moreover, the progressivity of the social security benefit
redistributes resources across the permanent earnings distribution, from rich to poor. These
distributional effects are of interest to us because saving behavior differs dramatically across
individuals in our benchmark economy. Hence, another question we ask is how does the
progressivity of social security benefits impact saving for health expenses?
To provide a quantitative answer to these questions, we consider four additional policies:
relative to the baseline, policies 9 and 11 replace progressive benefits with a proportional
one – the proportion is equal to that of an individual with average lifetime earnings in the
benchmark economy,– and policies 10 and 12 completely remove the social security system.
In addition, under policies 11 and 12 all OOP health expenses are removed through a public
health care program. The results of the policy experiments are presented in Table 14. Over-
all, the results indicate that the presence of OOP health expenses has non-trivial aggregate
and distributional implications for the impact of social security on capital accumulation.
Replacing the progressive social security benefit formula with a proportional one has a
large negative effect on aggregate capital, and the presence of OOP health expenses slightly
amplifies this effect. Removing progressivity reduces the aggregate capital stock by 8 percent
in the economy with OOP health expenses (policy 9 relative to baseline) and by 7 percent
in the economy without them (policy 11 relative to policy 3). Similarly to other policies
we have considered, changes in the aggregate capital are driven by wealth accumulation of
the top permanent earnings quintile. Here the role of the top quintile is pronounced the
most because this is the only quintile that sees a substantial increase in its social security
replacement rate when moving to the proportional benefit formula. 98 percent of the fall in
the aggregate capital under policy 9 is due to lower wealth accumulation by the top quintile.
Contrary to the above results, the presence of the social security system affects savings
more in the economy without OOP health expenses. Complete removal of the social security
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Table 14: Effects of Social Security Policies With and Without OOP Health Expense Risk
Policies Baseline 9 10 3 11 12
Social Security Prog. Prop. None Prog. Prop. None
Public Health Care No No No Yes Yes Yes
Aggregates
relative to baseline
Agg. Output 1.00 0.975 1.099 0.962 0.941 1.096
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.919 1.368 0.878 0.818 1.357
relative to Progressive SS, Public Health Care
Agg. Capital 1.00 0.932 1.547
relative to No Public Health Care, fixed SS system
Agg. Capital 0.878 0.889 0.992
change in wealth of PI quintiles, % of agg. capital change
All 100 100 100 100 100
First Quintile 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.6
Second Quintile -2.9 3.6 6.0 0.3 6.1
Third Quintile -3.1 12.6 15.3 7.3 15.2
Fourth Quintile 5.8 31.4 35.0 25.8 30.2
Fifth Quintile 98.0 51.2 39.6 63.2 47.0
wealth of PI quintiles relative to baseline
First Quintile 1.00 0.95 1.31 1.00 1.07 1.60
Second Quintile 1.00 1.07 1.37 0.80 0.98 1.61
Third Quintile 1.00 1.03 1.50 0.80 0.86 1.59
Fourth Quintile 1.00 0.98 1.54 0.80 0.78 1.50
Fifth Quintile 1.00 0.88 1.30 0.92 0.82 1.26
SS replacement rates by PI quintiles
First Quintile 0.88 0.44 0 0.88 0.44 0
Second Quintile 0.61 0.44 0 0.61 0.44 0
Third Quintile 0.49 0.44 0 0.49 0.44 0
Fourth Quintile 0.43 0.44 0 0.43 0.44 0
Fifth Quintile 0.34 0.44 0 0.34 0.44 0
Social Security Tax Rate 0.079 0.098 0 0.079 0.98 0
Income Tax Rate 0.254 0.266 0.235 0.257 0.268 0.219
OOP, % output 1.4 1.4 0.96 0 0 0
OOP, % total health exp. 70 66 50 0 0 0
Wealth Gini 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.81
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system increases the capital stock by 37 percent in the economy with OOP health expenses
(policy 10 relative to baseline) and by 55 percent in the economy without these expenses
(policy 12 relative to policy 3). Why does the presence of OOP health expenses reduce the
crowding out effect of social security on capital accumulation? Without public health care,
individuals maintain large savings well into the retirement to pay OOP health expenses that
grow with age. These savings also serve as a self-insurance against survival risk when the
social security annuity is removed. As a result, individuals do not need to increase their
savings as much as in the economy without OOP health expenses.
Another way to see the above results is by varying the presence of OOP health expenses
for a fixed social security system. The presence of a social security system amplifies the effect
of the OOP health expenses on wealth accumulation. Elimination of OOP health expenses
through public health care in the economy without social security reduces aggregate capital
by only 1 percent, while in the economy with the progressive and proportional social security
systems the capital stock falls by 12 and 11 percent respectively.
6.4 Relation to the Literature
Our analysis extends a large body of literature on life-cycle savings and the effects of so-
cial insurance policies. Hubbard et al. (1994) find that augmenting a life-cycle model by
including borrowing constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk, OOP medical
expense risk, and survival risk greatly improves the model’s ability to account for differ-
ences in savings patterns across education groups. Hubbard et al. (1995) show that in the
presence of means-tested social insurance, the model’s prediction that the poor are more
likely to hold little or no wealth is consistent with the data. However, they argue that an
increase in the consumption floor provided by a welfare program discourages savings of only
low-income households leaving high-income household wealth unaffected. We evaluate such
policy changes formally and show that on the contrary it is the high income households that
respond the most to changes in the social safety nets for medical and nursing home expenses.
Any quantitative study of the impact of medical expenses on cross-sectional and life-
cycle savings patterns depends crucially on the stochastic process for medical expenses. Due
to a lack of data, earlier studies indirectly assessed the process using health status and
consumption data. For example, Gertler and Gruber (2002) study the effects of public
disability insurance using a panel data set for Indonesia. In order to more accurately assess
the risk of OOP health expenses, some studies take a structural model estimation approach.
Using PSID data on elderly retirees, Palumbo (1999) finds that, in a model with survival
uncertainty, health uncertainty in a important predictor of consumption behavior of retirees.
46
However, the model still fails to account for the low rates of dissaving of the elderly. De
Nardi et al. (2006) use a more extensive health expenditure database (AHEAD) to estimate
a rich structural model of saving behavior of the elderly with heterogeneity in OOP health
expense risk and mortality. Similarly to our cross-sectional results, they find that OOP
health expenses and social safety nets have strong effects on individual savings with the
largest effects experienced by the top permanent earnings quintile. Their analysis, however,
does not model the wealth distribution at the retirement age, holding it fixed across policy
experiments. As we have shown in our model, individuals respond to old-age public policy
changes well before their retirement. Although De Nardi et al. estimate a larger risk of
OOP health expenses than previous studies, improving the model predictions about saving
behavior of the elderly, they acknowledge that their study still potentially understates the
risk of health expenses because these expenses do not include unobserved Medicaid transfers.
In contrast, we calibrate the stochastic process for total health expenses, including OOP and
Medicaid, so that the distribution of OOP expenses in the model matches a set of moments
that we estimate in the data.
A number of the cross-sectional results obtained in our policy analysis are qualitatively
consistent with the above literature. The contribution of our analysis is to provide a quan-
titative evaluation of aggregate and distributional effects of social insurance policies using a
theory of life-cycle inequality that is consistent with a large set of cross-sectional and life-
cycle patterns on earnings, medical, nursing home, and Medicaid expenses, as well as wealth
distribution in the U.S. economy. Furthermore, we explicitly model nursing home risk and
study the differential roles played by medical and nursing home expenses and their social
insurance − an issue that has not been explored in the previous literature.
Relative to the literature on social security with idiosyncratic risk, such as Huggett and
Ventura (1999), Fuster et al. (2004, 2006), our analysis is rather rudimentary as we do
not take into account labor supply responses to taxes and wages, nor do we model bequest
motives for savings. However, it is the first study to assess the effects of social security policy
in an environment with uncertainty about medical and nursing home expenses and their
social insurance. Our findings indicate that these features are important for the aggregate
and distributional effects of social security.
7 Conclusion
We have built a theory of life-cycle inequality with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk in earnings,
medical and nursing home expenses, and survival in order to quantitatively assess effects of
alternative social insurance policies on wealth accumulation and inequality. We find that
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medical and nursing home expenses greatly stimulate aggregate capital accumulation but
have a small effect on wealth inequality in the presence of social insurance. Removing old-age
safety nets including Medicaid has a large positive effect on aggregate capital accumulation
and generates a large reduction in wealth inequality. Overall, we find that distributional
effects in our model have important aggregate implications. We also find that differential
social insurance of medical versus nursing home expenses makes nursing home risk a relatively
more important driving force of the saving behavior of richer individuals. Furthermore, we
show that OOP health expenses have important implications for the effects of social security
on savings. We conclude that modeling medical and nursing home expenses is crucial for
social policy analysis.
Our calibration strategy exploits the assumption that the positive relationship observed
between individual permanent income and OOP health expenses (De Nardi et al. (2006))
is completely accounted for by the presence of safety nets. That is, richer individuals face
higher OOP expenses due to the means-testing of Medicaid transfers. However, it would
be interesting to relax this assumption by incorporating a choice of health care quality and
study how this margin responds to policy changes.
In order to make our results transparent, we simplified our analysis by abstracting from
differential mortality, marriages, and endogeneity of labor supply. Since in the data life
expectancy is higher for high-income individuals, the lifetime health expense risk faced by
these individuals is also higher, which may enhance the differential effects of social insurance
policies we found in our study. Marriages may be important because nursing home risk is
potentially different for married couples and risk-sharing is available within a household.
Abstraction from labor supply decisions means we have not taken into account labor income
tax distortions and the insurance role of labor through intertemporal substitution in response
to productivity shocks. Moreover, we have focused on life-cycle inequality and omitted
bequest motives and any other kind of intergenerational interactions. Fuster (1999) has
shown how dynastic linkages have important consequences for the effects of social security
policies on wealth inequality. Introducing the option for informal care through the family
– an important substitute for nursing home care – would allow one to analyze care-takers’
labor supply responses to social insurance policies. We leave these issues for future research.
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Appendix
A.1 Computation
The steps in computing the model equilibrium are as follows. First guesses on aggregate
capital and the income tax rate are made. Note that the social security tax rate can be
computed ex ante. Second, individual maximization problems are solved. Agents’ problems
in the last period of their lives are solved first, followed by the previous period, up to the
first period. Individual decision rules are computed using piecewise linear interpolation.
The grids for assets and average lifetime earnings consist of 200 and 100 nonlinearly-spaced
points, respectively. Third, the distribution of the population over the discrete state is com-
puted using forward iteration. Finally, updated aggregates are computed. This procedure is
iterated on until the capital stock converges and the government budget constraint holds.
A.2 Earnings Process
The stochastic component of the earnings process consists of a five-state discrete Markov
chain. The chain is characterized by a five element grid of possible realizations, an initial
distribution over that grid, Γz, and a 25 element probability transition matrix, Λzz′ . The
grid, which is set such that expected average annual earnings in the model is normalized
to one, is [−6.4823, 0.0155, 0.8747, 1.2000, 3.2102]. The initial distribution and probability
transition matrix, which contain 20 degrees of freedom after the restrictions on probabil-
ities are imposed, are chosen by minimizing the difference between the model’s predic-
tion and the data on the 24 statistics mentioned in Section 4.3. The minimization re-
sults are provided in Table 15. The initial distribution generated by the minimization is
[0.0552, 0.5270, 0.2578, 0.1300, 0.0300] and the probability transition matrix is
0.9684 0.0267 0.0049 0.0000 0
0.0424 0.9305 0.0271 0.0000 0
0.0079 0.0229 0.9682 0.0010 0.0000
0 0.0052 0.0635 0.9300 0.0013
0 0.0104 0.0198 0.0200 0.9497
 .
As a check on the calibration of the earnings process, Table 16 shows average annual
earnings by permanent earnings quintile from the model. Earnings are converted to 2000
dollars using our estimate of expected average lifetime earnings of $32,828 (see footnote ??).
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Table 15: Targets for Earnings Process: Data and Model
Targeted Moments Data Model
Earnings
First-order autocorrelation 0.98 0.97
Variance log earnings, ratio age 55 to age 35 1.89 1.33
Gini 0.61 0.56
Shares of Total, %
First Quintile -0.2 0.3
Second Quintile 4.0 7.4
Third Quintile 13.0 13.4
Fourth Quintile 22.9 22.1
Fifth Quintile 60.2 57.8
Top 10% 42.9 40.2
Top 5% 31.1 31.4
Top 1% 15.3 15.9
Social Security Income
Shares and Means, % shares mean†
First Quintile 5.7 3.9 8 7
Second Quintile 15.4 14.5 21 25
Third Quintile 20.4 20.7 28 35
Fourth Quintile 24.5 28.2 34 49
Fifth Quintile 34.0 33.3 47 58
Top 10% 8.3 17.8
Top 5% 8.2 9.5
Top 1% 3.1 2.0
† normalized by p.c. income
Table 16: Average Annual Earnings by Permanent Earnings Quintile in the Baseline Model,
2000 dollars
First Quintile 4,201
Second Quintile 14,845
Third Quintile 23,687
Fourth Quintile 39,249
Fifth Quintile 82,058
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A.3 Medical Expense Process
The stochastic component of the medical expense process is governed by a four-point discrete
Markov chain. Its grid of realizations is [−5.83,−3.00,−1.70, 0.685], the initial distribution
of non-nursing home entrants across medical expenses, Γh, is [0.2205, 0.2177, 0.5209, 0.0409],
and the probability transition matrix conditional on not entering a nursing home next period,
Λhh′ , is 
0.6510 0.2290 0.1100 0.0100
0.1512 0.7427 0.0961 0.0099
0.0423 0.1668 0.7809 0.0105
0.1016 0.3244 0.4998 0.0743
 .
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Figure 1: Life Cycle Profiles In the Benchmark Economy: Inequality
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Figure 2: Life Cycle Profiles In the Benchmark Economy: Medicaid
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Figure 3: OOP Health Expenses by PI Quintiles in the Benchmark Economy
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Figure 4: Public Health Care Policies: Effects on Saving Behavior
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Figure 5: Public Health Care Policies: Inequality Effects
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Figure 6: Quality Nursing Home Care and Public Health Care Policies
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